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One of the reasons for the heated de-
bates around the interpretations of quan-
tum theory is a simple confusion between
the notions of formalism versus interpre-
tation. In this note, we make a clear dis-
tinction between them and show that there
are actually two inequivalent quantum for-
malisms, namely the relative-state for-
malism and the standard formalism with
the Born and measurement-update rules.
We further propose a different probability
rule for the relative-state formalism and
discuss how Wigner’s-friend-type experi-
ments could show the inequivalence with
the standard formalism. The feasibility in
principle of such experiments, however, re-
mains an open question.
1 Intoduction
1.1 Mathematical Formalisms and Interpreta-
tions
A physical theory1 comprises a mathematical for-
malism, which allows for predicting the outcomes
of scientific experiments, and some ontological
interpretation. In the case of quantum theory,
the predictions are probabilistic and often con-
flict with proposed descriptions of the experi-
ment in terms of classical information [3, 19].
The arise of apparently classical information dur-
ing a measurement, i.e., a definite result, poses
a conceptual problem for quantum theory. In
what is called standard quantum mechanics, the
measurement-update rule, commonly associated
with a collapse, is a break with the otherwise uni-
tary evolution governed by the Schrödinger equa-
tion. The formalism, however, provides no indi-
cation about when to apply this rule: It does not
1 We will use the terms scientific and empirical refer-
ring mostly to natural sciences and physics in particular.
state what qualifies some interactions as measure-
ments but not others (the measurement problem).
The relative-state formalism [12] seems to avoid
the problem by postulating universal, unitary
quantum theory. This, however, detaches the for-
malism from predicting outcomes of experiments,
for which some sort of Born rule [5] is needed.
This is not specified by the original relative-state
formalism at all, but the use of the Born rule has
been motivated by a many-worlds interpretation
and decision-theoretical arguments [10, 25].
We want to stress that universal, unitary quan-
tum theory is a new type of formalism which is
fundamentally different from the measurement-
update rule of standard quantum mechanics. It
is not a new interpretation; the many-worlds in-
terpretation is the best-known interpretation of
the relative-state formalism. One can regard a
generalised version of Bohmian mechanics [27] as
a different interpretation of that formalism.
Throughout this note we will treat the relative-
state formalism as a different formalism than the
Born and measurement-update rule of standard
quantum mechanics. We postulate an alternative
“Born rule” motivated by the work of G. Hermann
[18]. Equipped with this “Born rule,” the relative-
state formalism reproduces the same probabili-
ties as standard quantum mechanics for consecu-
tive measurements on one quantum system — the
same level of observation. But the two formalisms
are inequivalent in case of encapsulated observers
— different levels of observation, Wigner’s-friend-
type experiments [30]. The latter was first con-
sidered by D. Deutsch [9] and is made explicit in
Chapter 4.
1.2 Consistency of Quantum Theory
One manifestation of the quantum-measurement
problem are Wigner’s-friend-type gedankenexper-
iments. In the original version, an observer —
the friend F — performs a measurement MF on
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the quantum system emitted by the source S.
Both the system and the friend (or the friend’s
memory) are then jointly measured by a super-
observer — Wigner W — performing measure-
ment MW . Standard quantum mechanics sug-
gests that, according to the friend, the state
of the system collapses to the eigenvector as-
sociated with the observed measurement result.
To Wigner, however, the joint quantum system
supposedly evolves unitarily. Such a subjective-
collapse model, namely that each agent attributes
a collapse merely to their own measurement, leads
to seemingly contradictory predictions among the
agents, see [2, 13]. Descriptions of Wigner’s-
friend-type setups based on the relative-state for-
malism do not give rise to problematic predic-
tions, neither do objective-collapse models, or any
other version in which there is consensus on the
application of the measurement-update rule. The
possibility of classical communication between
the agents in a Wigner’s-friend-type experiment
is essential for the problematic predictions to give
rise to an actual contradiction, see Chapters 2 and
5.
2 Scientific Theories
We regard a physical theory as a mathematical
formalism equipped with some ontological inter-
pretation. The formalism needs to predict the
outcomes of scientific experiments, i.e., measure-
ment results.
Definition 1. Two mathematical formalisms are
empirically equivalent if they yield the same pre-
dictions for the outcomes of all possible experi-
ments.
Examples for this are the general probabilis-
tic theories formulation and operational quan-
tum theory. They are designed to be empiri-
cally equivalent to standard quantum mechanics
— i.e., reproduce quantum probabilities — and
give insight into the general structure of the the-
ory, see [8, 16, 21].
We furthermore require that the predictions of
measurement results render the theory falsifiable,
as proposed by K. Popper [23]. If a scientific the-
ory gives rise to predictions that contradict the
actual outcomes of experiments, or make contra-
dictory predictions regarding these outcomes, it
should be dismissed. We want to stress that fal-
sification corresponds to a contradiction on the
level of classical information. Results of scientific
experiments and statements regarding these ex-
periments can be represented as entities of clas-
sical information, i.e., bit strings. If two such
pieces of classical information are contradictory,
they falsify the theory used to derive them.
Definition 2. Pieces of information are classi-
cal if and only if they satisfy the requirements
of interoperability — i.e., they can be copied —
and distinguishability — i.e., different informa-
tion can be told apart perfectly.
Our definition of classicality throughout this note
focuses on qualitative notions regarding informa-
tion and not on the physical realisation.
Definition 3. A scientific contradiction is given
by two pieces of contradictory classical informa-
tion in one point in space and time.
Many quantum scenarios involving post-
selection, for example [1, 29], seem contradictory.
But these apparent contradictions usually arise
from attributing definite properties to systems
at times, where these attributes do not represent
classical information.
Statements about quantum experiments, fur-
thermore, depend on the interpretation of the
quantum formalism. We argue that there are
actually two empirically inequivalent quantum
formalisms, with different interpretations. If a
certain combination of formalism and ontological
interpretation leads to a scientific contradiction,
this combination should be excluded.
We want to emphasise the importance of linking
any quantum formalism to classical information
and measurement outcomes in order to have a
physical theory as described above.
3 Two Quantum Formalisms
Using our definitions in Chapter 2, we propose
that there are two different quantum formalisms
for describing a measurement, which are empiri-
cally inequivalent when considering encapsulated
observers, i.e., Wigner’s-friend-type experiments.
We will focus on pure states and projective mea-
surements in the main text; a discussion of the
general case can be found in Appendix A.
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3.1 Standard Quantum Mechanics
In what is usually called standard quantum me-
chanics, the description of a measurement is
governed by two expressions. The Born rule
gives the probability of a measurement result
for a quantum state |φ〉 and an observable A =∑
a a|a〉〈a|,
pφ(a) = Tr(|a〉〈a||φ〉〈φ|) = |〈a|φ〉|2. (1)
The measurement-update rule gives the quantum
state of the system after the measurement,
|φ〉 A−−−−−→
result: a
|a〉. (2)
Both the Born and the measurement-update rules
can be motivated from the process-matrix formal-
ism [7, 22] by considering separate and consec-
utive measurements, see [26]. In particular, the
measurement-update rule can be regarded as nec-
essary for giving the correct probabilities for the
results of consecutive measurements on one quan-
tum system.
We will examine conditional probabilities of re-
sults of consecutive measurements by different
observers. Consider two observers O1 and O2 suc-
cessively measuring a quantum system initially
in state |φ〉, see Fig. 1. Their measurements are
given by MO1 : {|a〉〈a|} and MO2 : {|b〉〈b|}. Ac-
cording to standard quantum mechanics, i.e., us-
ing equations (2) and (1), the conditional proba-
bility of result b given a is
pφ(b|a) = pφ(a, b)∑
b pφ(a, b)
= Tr(|b〉〈b||a〉〈a|)
= |〈b|a〉|2,
(3)
where pφ(a, b) = Tr(|b〉〈b||a〉〈a||φ〉〈φ||a〉〈a||b〉〈b|)
is the joint probability of a and b.
3.2 The Relative-State Formalism
In his thesis, H. Everett III proposed the for-
malism of universal, unitary quantum mechanics,
where the measurement is an entangling unitary
between the quantum system and the observer.
Equivalently, measurements can be represented
as isometries, correlating the (memory) state of
the observer with the state of the observed sys-
tem. Consider a system in state |φ〉 and an ob-
server O performing a projective measurement
MO : {|a〉〈a|S}.
VO : HS → HS ⊗HO (4)
|a〉S 7→ |a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉O ∀a,
|φ〉S
MO1 : {|a〉〈a|S}
MO2 : {|b〉〈b|S}
Figure 1: The same level of observation: Two observers
O1 and O2 are performing consecutive measurements on
a quantum system, initially in state |φ〉 ∈ HS . In this
case, the measurement-update rule and the relative-state
formalism give the same conditional probabilities for the
measurement results of the two observers.
where {|Aa〉}a is an orthogonal set recording the
result. One can regard |Aa〉 as the state of the
observer having seen result a.
A general state |φ〉 then evolves as follows:
|φ〉 =
∑
a
〈a|φ〉|a〉 7→
∑
a
〈a|φ〉|a〉 ⊗ |Aa〉 = |φtot〉
(5)
An overall entangled state, however, does not pre-
dict the outcomes of the measurement. Hence,
there have been various attempts to justify the
Born rule, Eq. (1), within the relative-state for-
malism. Independently of Everett’s mathemati-
cal formulation, G. Hermann [17] argued that the
quantum state of the observed system is relative
to the observing system and this relation is de-
fined by and accessible only after the measure-
ment. It is the state of the observing system that
represents the measurement result and with re-
spect to which the state of the observed system
is defined. We, therefore, propose the following
“Born rule” for the evolution in Eq. (4).
Postulate 1. Given a quantum state |φ〉 and a
measurement with outcomes {a}, the probability
of observing a is given by the trace of the pro-
jection onto the state |Aa〉 of the observer having
seen a acting on the overall state evolving accord-
ing to the relative-state formalism
qφ(a) = Tr(1S ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa|O · VO|φ〉〈φ|V †O) . (6)
For one observer measuring a quantum system
this is equivalent to the Born rule of standard
quantum mechanics
qφ(a) = |〈a|φ〉|2 = pφ(a) . (7)
Eq. (1), however, can also be used to motivate the
measurement-update rule in Eq. (2).
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Postulate 2. The joint probability of observa-
tions of states is given by the trace of the tensor
product of the projectors onto those states act-
ing on the overall state evolving according to the
relative-state formalism.
Hence, the joint probability of observing the sys-
tem in an eigenstate |a′〉 of the observer’s mea-
surement and the observer having seen outcome
a is
qφ(|a′〉, a) = Tr(|a′〉〈a′|S ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa|OVO|φ〉〈φ|V †O)
= |〈a|φ〉|2δa,a′ .
(8)
This can be read as the probability of the system
being in the state |a〉, given that the observer has
seen outcome a, is 1, which is exactly the state-
ment of Eq. (2).
Moreover, let observer O1 perform measurement
MO1 : {|a〉〈a|} on a quantum system in state |φ〉
and observer O2 then measure the same system,
with MO2 : {|b〉〈b|}. According to Postulates 1
and 2, the conditional probability for the mea-
surement results b given a is
qφ(b|a) = qφ(a, b)
qMφ (a)
= (9)
Tr(1S ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa| ⊗ |Bb〉〈Bb||Φtot〉〈Φtot|)∑
b Tr(1S ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa| ⊗ |Bb〉〈Bb||Φtot〉〈Φtot|)
,
where |Φtot〉 = VO2VO1 |φ〉S . Straight-forward cal-
culations show that
qφ(b|a) = |〈b|a〉|2 = p(b|a). (10)
The conditional probabilities are the same as
those given by the measurement-update rule of
standard quantum mechanics. Hence, Eqs. (7)
and (10) justify the use the standard Born and
measurement-update rules within the relative-
state formalism as long as one considers the same
level of observation. This agrees with former
motivations of the standard Born rule for the
relative-state formalism but is independent of the
interpretation.
3.3 Inequivalence
So far the standard quantum and the relative-
state formalisms yield the same probabilistic pre-
dictions. We will now consider encapsulated ob-
servers, see Fig. 2, and show that a particular
version of standard quantum mechanics and the
relative-state formalism equipped with the “Born
rule,” Eq. (1), are empirically inequivalent.
Consider a quantum system in state |φ〉, an ob-
server O measuring MO : {|a〉〈a|S} and a su-
perobserver SO measuring the joint system with
MSO : {|b〉〈b|S,O}. The standard Born rule, the
measurement-update rule, and the observer mea-
suring outcome a are supposed to lead to the over-
all state
|φ〉s A−−−−−→
result: a
|a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉S = |a⊗Aa〉S,O . (11)
For the situation depicted in Fig. 2, the condi-
tional probabilities for the results b measured by
the superobserver are
pφ(b|a) = pφ(a, b)∑
b pφ(a, b)
= |〈b|a⊗Aa〉S,O|2 . (12)
This description represents an actual collapse of
the wavefunction on the level of the observer.
According to the relative-state formalism, how-
ever, the observer’s measurement corresponds to
an isometry, Eq. (4). The same is true for the
superobserver
VSO : HS ⊗HO → HS ⊗HO ⊗HSO (13)
|b〉S,O 7→ |b〉S,O ⊗ |Bb〉SO, ∀b.
Let, now, {|b〉S,O} be a general orthonormal basis
on the joint space HS ⊗ HO. The conditional
probabilities of the results b of the superobserver,
given result a of the observer, are
qφ(b|a) = Tr(1S ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa| ⊗ |Bb〉〈Bb||Φtot〉〈Φtot|)
qMφ (a)
(14)
=
pφ(b|a)
∑
a′a′′
〈φ|a′′〉〈a′|φ〉〈b|a′ ⊗Aa′〉〈a′′ ⊗Aa′′ |b〉
qMφ (a)
.
This is equal to Eq. (12) if and only if ∀b : ∃a0, a1 :
|b〉S,O = |a0〉S ⊗ |Aa1〉O. In that case the sum in
Eq. (14) reduces to pφ(a)δa,a0 and qMφ (a) = pφ(a),
hence, qφ(b|a) = pφ(b|a).
The empirical inequivalence between the two for-
malisms and its possible consequences for quan-
tum theory become manifest in Wigner’s-friend-
type experiments. There, the observer and the
superobserver are supposed to be thinking (or
computing) entities knowing the setup and are, in
principle, able to calculate the conditional prob-
abilities for the measurements involved.
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|φ〉S
MO : {|a〉〈a|S}
MSO : {|b〉〈b|S,O}
Figure 2: Different levels of observation: Observer O
performs a measurement on a quantum system S in state
|φ〉. A superobserver SO then performs a measurement
on the joint system including the observer O. For this
type of consecutive measurements, the standard quan-
tum formalism and the relative-state formalism yield dif-
ferent conditional probabilities for the measurement re-
sults. Hence, the two formalisms are empirically inequiv-
alent.
S MF
| ↑〉|U〉
| ↓〉|D〉
MW
|φ+〉|+〉
|φ−〉|−〉
|φ〉
C
Figure 3: The source S emits a qubit |φ〉 = 1/√2
(| ↑〉 + | ↓〉), which is measured by the friend F in the
basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉}. Wigner W then measures the joint
system in the superposition basis {|φ±〉 = 1/√2(| ↑
⊗U〉 ± | ↓ ⊗D〉)}. If F applies the measurement-
update rule for his measurement, while W describes it
via a unitary evolution, they will calculate different con-
ditional probabilities for their results. This can be posed
as contradicting statements regardingW ’s measurement
result. These statements, however, only give rise to a
scientific contradiction if F and W can communicate
classically —i.e., their statements can be compared at
some point.
4 Wigner’s Friend
The simplest version of the Wigner’s-friend ex-
periment is depicted in Fig. 3. A qubit in state
|φ〉 is measured by observer F after which a su-
perobserver W measures the joint system of the
qubit and the observer’s memory. The superob-
server is said to have full quantum control. There
are two unproblematic descriptions of the situa-
tion. Both agents apply the measurement-update
rule for every measurement and, hence, calculate
the conditional probabilities for their results ac-
cording to Eq. (12). This case corresponds to an
objective collapse during a measurement. Alter-
natively, all agents can use the relative-state for-
malism and calculate the conditional probabili-
ties using Eq. (14). We might call this the no-
Figure 4: Let the source emit |φ〉 = 1/√2(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉),
F measure it in basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉}) and W measure the
joint system in the basis (e.g., {|φ±〉 = 1/√2(| ↑ ⊗U〉±
| ↓ ⊗D〉)}. If the friend calculates the conditional prob-
abilities with a collapse model, while Wigner uses the
relative-state formalism, they will give contradicting an-
swers to the question “CanW measure “−”?” regardless
of F ’s measurement result.
collapse model. It has been argued, however,
that standard quantum mechanics suggests that
F uses the measurement-update rule after his
measurement and, therefore, Eq. (12). But W , to
whom the joint quantum system evolves unitarily,
uses Eq. (14) instead. We call this the subjective-
collapse model.
In the case of qubit state |φ〉 = 1/√2(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉),
F measuring in the σz-basis, {| ↑〉, | ↓〉}, and W
measuring in basis {|b〉S,O}, where | ↑ ⊗U〉 =
α|b1〉+β|b2〉 and | ↓ ⊗D〉 = β|b1〉−α|b2〉, the two
formalisms yield the following conditional proba-
bilities.
measurement-update rule
z p(b1 | z) p(b2 | z)
u α2 β2
d β2 α2
(15)
relative-state formalism
z q(b1 | z) q(b2 | z)
u
(
α+β
2α
)2 (α−β
2β
)2
d
(
α+β
2β
)2 (α−β
2α
)2 (16)
For Wigner measuring in the basis {|φ±〉 =
1/
√
2(| ↑ ⊗U〉 ± | ↓ ⊗D〉)}, this leads to con-
tradicting statements of F and W regarding the
possibility of W measuring result“−,” see Fig. 4.
In [13] the authors derive another contradiction
for a combination of two standard Wigner’s-
friend experiments, see Fig 5. The four parties
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a
C MF1 MA
|φC〉
S MF2 MW
|φS〉
b
Figure 5: a. The source in the first laboratory emits a
coin state |φC〉 which is measured by F1, with outcomes
{h, t}. Depending on the result, F1 sends state |φS〉
which is measured by F2. Assistant A and Wigner W
perform measurements in superposition bases, with out-
comes {f, o}, on the first and second joint system, re-
spectively. b. If F1 uses the measurement-update rule,
while W describes the measurement according to the
relative-state formalism, they get different conditional
probabilities for their outcomes. Upon observing out-
come t, F1 will predict that W will measure f with
certainty. According to W , however, there should be in-
stantiations of the experiment where F1 observes t but
he will measure o.
involved are two observers — friend F1 and friend
F2 — and two superobservers — Wigner W and
his assistant A. This contradiction is more strik-
ing since it can be phrased in terms of determinis-
tic predictions of the results in one particular run
of the experiment. The arise of F1’s prediction,
however, is empirically equivalent to him using
the state |t〉C ⊗ |T 〉F1 ⊗ | →〉S to calculate condi-
tional probabilities according to Eq. (12), where
the joint probability is
pφC (c, w) =
Tr(Kw|C〉〈C|(|φC〉〈φC | ⊗ 1)|C〉〈C|K†w),
with |C〉 = |c〉C ⊗ |Cc〉F1 ⊗ |φS(c)〉S and Kw =
|w〉〈w|F2,SVF2 . W ’s predictions, on the other
hand, are empirically equivalent to using the over-
all entangled state arising from the unitary evo-
lution and Eq. (14).
In general, the subjective-collapse model presents
a problematic description of experiments featur-
ing encapsulated observers. Whether it should be
excluded depends on whether it gives rise to a sci-
entific contradiction, as discussed in Chapters 5
and 6.
Moreover, the Wigner’s-friend experiment can
distinguish between the two quantum formalisms
— i.e., Born and (objective) measurement-
update rule or the relative-state formalism with
the “Born rule”— when they are applied for all
measurements by all agents involved.
5 Facts of the World and Interpreta-
tions
Interpretations of scientific theories attribute on-
tological concepts to the entities of the mathe-
matical formalism and can roughly be regarded
as answering the question “What does the formal-
ism mean?”. In general this specifies a connection
between the formalism and some notion of reality,
i.e., facts.
Definition 4. If two scientific theories are em-
pirically equivalent, they are called different in-
terpretations of the same formalism.
Note that, according to our Defs. 1 and 4, only
a formalism together with an interpretation con-
stitutes a scientific theory2. We want to point
out, however, that “Shut up and calculate!” also
involves an interpretation of the quantum formal-
ism, namely that the formalism is merely a tool
to calculate probabilities for measurement out-
comes, which are the only facts in this approach.
If one assumes the quantum formalism to describe
an objective reality one might talk about facts per
se. In that case, all agents in a Wigner’s-friend-
type experiment must use either the collapse for-
malism or the relative-state formalism (for all
measurements) or the theory is self-contradictory.
Interpretations of this type are for example, part
of all objective collapse models, the many-worlds
interpretation and Bohmian mechanics. A mod-
ification of the standard quantum formalism as
in [15] allows for an objective interpretation with
a “real” collapse. We argue that the many-worlds
interpretation and generalised Bohmian mechan-
ics are different interpretations of the relative-
state formalism according to Def. 4. Both use the
same unitary evolution of a global wave function
regardless of a measurement happening or not.
In case of the many-worlds interpretation, this
2 The interpretations of quantum theory presented here
are by no means a complete list, but rather serve to illus-
trate our argument.
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global wave function corresponds to the state of
reality and a multiverse, a branch of which rep-
resents what we observe. In Bohmian mechanics
the global wave function is the pilot wave but the
state of reality is the so-called real state vector.
The latter arises from the decomposition of the
pilot wave into vectors of viable subspaces, which
is related to Bell’s beables [4, 27]. The real state
vectors evolve probabilistically due to transitions
between the viable subspaces. But since the prob-
abilities of measurement results, via the real state
vectors, are determined by the pilot wave, the
predictions match those of the relative-state for-
malism, see Appendix B for an explicit example.
If one adopts a subjective application of the two
formalisms, i.e., subjective collapse, as a conse-
quence there are only facts relative to the ob-
server, see [6]. In other words, a subjective-
collapse model requires a subjective interpreta-
tion like, for example, relational quantum me-
chanics or QBism [14, 24]. This circumvents con-
sistency requirements imposed by the idea of the
quantum formalism describing an objective real-
ity per se. Note, however, that a scientific con-
tradiction in a Wigner’s-friend-type experiment
based on the subjective collapse would exclude
that model irrespective of the interpretation.
To, once more, stress the distinction between
a formalism and an interpretation, we want to
point out that our reading of the relative-state
formalism, and in particular our motivation for
the “Born rule,” is along the lines of facts relative
to the observer.
6 Wigner’s-Friend-Type Experiments
and Classical Information
A scientific contradiction comprises contradicting
pieces of classical information and must not arise
for a scientific theory. Considering classical in-
formation in Wigner’s-friend-type experiments is
essential for deciding, whether the subjective col-
lapse model is scientifically contradictory. Even
given a subjective interpretation, classical infor-
mation should be intersubjectively agreed on by
all agents and, therefore, must not be contra-
dictory. In other words, a subjective interpreta-
tion cannot resolve the problematic descriptions
in Chapter 4 if they give rise to a scientific con-
tradiction.
The notion of classicality in Def. 2 allows for in-
corporating it into the quantum formalism. An
orthonormal basis {|i〉} represents classical infor-
mation if and only if all accessible observables
are diagonal in that basis. This notion of clas-
sical information is independent of whether one
attributes the arise of classicality to the dynam-
ics of the observed system [31] or the observation
itself [20].
In the context of Wigner’s-friend-type experi-
ments, the observer’s measurement result does
not represent classical information, since it does
not satisfy interoperability. This is reflected in
the fact that the inconsistent predictions arise
only if there is no classical record revealing the
observers’ results. Consider a register system
{|xi〉 ∈ HR} representing classical information.
In the relative-state formalism, this corresponds
to the isometry
VO : HS → HS ⊗HO ⊗HR (17)
|a〉S 7→ |a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉O ⊗ |xa〉R ∀a,
where |xi〉 ∈ HR can be thought to represent the
observer’s statements. Since the {|xi〉} form a
basis, the statements they encode should be in-
formationally complete, by which we mean that
∀s : |xj〉 ∼= s ∃|xj′〉 ∈ {|xi〉} : |xj′〉 ∼= ¬s.
The conditional probability for the measurement
results can then be defined as
qclass(b|a) := qφ(a, xa, b)∑
b qφ(a, xa, b)
= Tr(|xa〉〈xa| ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa| ⊗ |Bb〉〈Bb||Φtot〉〈Φtot|)Tr(|xa〉〈xa| ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa||Φtot〉〈Φtot|)
⇒ qclass(b|a) 6= qφ(b|a). (18)
It follows from this that the extended Wigner’s-
friend experiment in Fig. 5 cannot give rise to a
scientific contradiction: F1’s deterministic predic-
tion “w = f ” arises only for |t〉C ⊗ |T 〉F1 ⊗ | →〉S .
If there is a classical record of this statement, the
overall probability distribution matches the pre-
dictions of F1:
Extended Wigner’s-Friend Experiment
c qclass(o | c) qclass(f | c)
h 12
1
2
t 0 1,
(19)
Since the prediction “p(+) = p(−) = 12 ” in the
original Wigner’s-friend experiment depicted in
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Fig. 3 arises for both | ↑〉S⊗|U〉F and | ↓〉S⊗|D〉F
the existence of a classical record of this state-
ment does not affect the conditional probabilities.
Original Wigner’s-Friend Experiment
z qclass(+ | z) qclass(− | z)
u 1 0
d 1 0
(20)
It is, however, not clear to us whether the
observer’s computation leading to this state-
ment is compatible with being under full quan-
tum control. The respective classical register
would be {|si〉} with i = 0, 1, 2, where |s0 ∼=
“no measurement”〉, |s1 ∼= “50 : 50”〉 and |s2 ∼=
“¬(50 : 50)”〉. Note that the map
|z ⊗ Z〉S,O ⊗ |s0〉R 7→ |z ⊗ Z〉S,O ⊗ |s1〉R,
with |s1〉 being the same for both | ↑ ⊗U〉 and
| ↓ ⊗D〉, cannot be a unitary on the joint space
HS ⊗HO ⊗HR, where HR = span{|si〉}.
7 Discussion
An onthological interpretation of a mathematical
formalism establishes a correspondence between
the mathematical objects of the theory and ele-
ments of some ontology. The latter is associated
with factual classical information. In most phys-
ical theories, an identification of the entities in
the formalism with an ontological description in
terms of classical information is usually unam-
biguous and generally agreed upon. In the case
of quantum theory, however, attempts to do so
usually lead to paradoxes, like Schrödinger’s cat
or spooky action at a distance to explain Bell-
non-local correlations. Therefore, there are vari-
ous interpretations of quantum theory ascribing
different notions of a factual reality to different
entities in the formalism. We defined different
interpretations of the same formalism to be em-
pirically equivalent, i.e., they give the same pre-
dictions for the results of all experiments. We
showed that there are two empirically inequiva-
lent quantum formalisms regarding the descrip-
tion of a measurement — the standard Born- and
measurement-update rule and the relative state
formalism. The difference between the two be-
comes apparent only in Wigner’s-friend-type ex-
periments. There, the possibility of classical com-
munication and the subjective application of the
two formalisms might give rise to a scientific con-
tradiction, i.e., contradictory classical informa-
tion.
We attempt in this note to contribute to the
discussion on the meaning and interpretation of
quantum theory by making clearer the separation
line between mathematical formalisms and their
ontological interpretations — they have, in our
opinion, too often been confused.
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A General Formulation
Consider a general quantum state ρ of some system and an observable {K†aKa}, where {a} are the
outcomes and Ka is the Kraus operator associated with outcome a. The probability of outcome a is
then
pρ(a) = Tr(KaρK†a). (21)
The measurement-update rule for the general case is
ρ −−−−−→
result: a
1
pρ(a)
KaρK
†
a. (22)
The action of a Kraus operator Ka on ρ can always be written as
ρ→ 〈a|Us,x (ρ⊗ |a0〉〈a0|)U †s,x|a〉, (23)
where {|a〉} form an orthonormal basis in an ancillary space HX and Ux,s is a unitary operator on
HS ⊗HX . Using representation (23), the measurement in the relative-state formalism is given by an
isometry correlating the ancillary system with the observer’s memory:
VO : HX → HX ⊗HO (24)
|a〉X 7→ |a〉X ⊗ |Aa〉O ∀a ,
and a general state ρ then evolves as follows:
ρ → ρtot =
∑
cc′aa′
ρcc′aa′ |c〉〈c′|S ⊗ VO|a〉〈a′|XV †O, (25)
with ρcc′aa′ = 〈c| ⊗ 〈a|Us,x (ρ⊗ |a0〉〈a0|)U †s,x|a′〉 ⊗ |c′〉.
Again, straight-forward (but tedious) calculation shows that
qρ(a) = Tr(1S,X ⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa|O · ρtot) =
∑
c
ρccaa = Tr(KaρK†a) = pρ(a).
For two observers performing consecutive measurements on one system — MO1 : {K†aKa} and MO2 :
{K†bKb} — one gets
qρ(b|a) = 1
qρ(a)
Tr(1⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa|O1 ⊗ |Bb〉〈Bb|O2 · ρ′tot) =
1
qρ(a)
∑
c
ρccaabb
= 1
pρ(a)
Tr(KbKaρK†aK
†
b ) = Tr
(
Kb
(
KaρK
†
a
pρ(a)
)
K†b
)
= pρ(b|a),
with ρ′tot =
∑
cc′aa′
bb′
ρcc′aa′bb′ |c〉〈c′| ⊗ VO1 |a〉〈a′|V †O1 ⊗ VO2 |b〉〈b′|V
†
O2
,
where ρcc′aa′bb′ = 〈cab|Us,y(Us,xρ⊗ |a0〉〈a0|XU †s,x)⊗ |b0〉〈b0|Y U †s,y|c′a′b′〉
and |cab〉 = |c〉S ⊗ |a〉X ⊗ |b〉Y . Hence, on the same level of observation, the relative-state formal-
ism together with Postulates 1 and 2 gives the same probabilistic predictions as the standard Born
and measurement-update rules also for generalised measurements. One can motivate the use of the
measurement-update rule, (22), within the relative-state formalism by Eq. (26). If the conditional
probabilities for consecutive measurements on one quantum system are calculated by the “Born rule”,
the measurement-update rule gives the correct state assignment when using the standard Born rule.
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B Relative-State Formalism and Bohmian Mechanics
It has been show already, see for example [11], that for the same level of observation, Bohmian me-
chanics gives the same probabilistic predictions as the standard quantum formalism.
For different levels of observation we consider the example in Fig. 5. A description of the extended
Wigner’s-friend experiment in terms of generalised Bohmian mechanics was presented in [28], including
the following joint probabilities for A’s and W ’s outcomes (a,w) calculated for different agents:
p(a,w) p(o, o) p(o, f) p(f, o) p(f, f)
F1
1
12
5
12
1
12
5
12
F2
1
12
1
12
5
12
5
12
A 14
1
4
1
20
9
20
W 112
1
12
1
12
3
4
(26)
The last line representing W equals the joint probabilities qφ(a,w) calculated from the state evolving
according to the relative-state formalism and Eq. (1).
qφ(a,w) = Tr(1⊗ |Aa〉〈Aa| ⊗ |Ww〉〈Ww| · |φtot〉〈φtot|)
with: |φtot〉 = VWVAVF2VF1 |φC〉〈φC |V †F1V
†
F2
V †AV
†
W .
(27)
The probability distribution of A can be obtained by renormalising the conditional probabilities qφ(w|a)
calculated according to Eq. (9). The friends’ distributions arise when one takes the conditional prob-
abilities qφ(a|z) for F2, who measures result z, and qφ(w|c) for F1, who measures result c, and renor-
malises them to give distribution for both results. One might think of this as each friend neglecting
the measurement performed on them and predicting the superobservers’ outcomes depending on their
result. We leave it for future work to show empirical equivalence for the general case but argue that
the comparison above supports our claim that one can regard generalised Bohmian mechanics as an
interpretation of the relative-state formalism according to Def. 4.
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